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Comments on Warren Grimes:
Transparency in Federal Antitrust
Enforcement
ROBERT PITOFSKYt

Transparency in government process-primarily fair
and responsive explanations of government action and
inaction-is an important issue. Professor Warren Grimes's
article addresses this topic and explains in detail why
transparency matters.l In particular, he emphasizes that
merger enforcement has become the predominant
government enforcement activity in the antitrust field. It is
increasingly a matter of bureaucratic judgments because
relatively few mergers are challenged in court, and almost
all are settled with a restructuring consent order or
abandonment.
I agree. Yet, Professor Grimes's proposed remedy, while
it points in the right direction, seems to me excessive. He
urges that the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
publicly explain all settlements, explain all failures to act,
describe near-miss theories that were not pursued even
when they did act, and issue statements about the facts
relevant to mergers that were abandoned. He also asks that
the agencies release summary information with respect to
parties, transactions and markets in which parties are
active after each filing of a proposed merger by the merging
parties. In light of the levels of disclosure already pursued
by the two antitrust enforcement agencies, these rules seem
to me unnecessary.
Let me start by setting aside reasons that some have
offered to curtail the level of transparency. Professor
t Sheehy Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Of Counsel,
Arnold & Porter; Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 1995-2001.
1. Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51
BUFF. L. REV. 937 (2003).
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Grimes notes that there is a risk that confidential business
information will be disclosed in the process of explaining
decisions. But that should not be controlling. The agency
staff can be careful to explain its actions or inactions
without breaching confidentiality rules. Perhaps disclosure
of reasons why enforcement action was not taken will be
cited later by defenders of a transaction, but that is no
reason not to disclose reasons for enforcement decisions. If
the first decision was wrong, the agency has a responsibility
to admit it; if the facts are different, the agency has a
responsibility to explain. Finally, there is no reason to fear
that publication of reasons for decisions, which is already
going on at an increasing pace, will politicize enforcement
decisions.
The primary reason why an absolute requirement of
explanations of all decisions is inappropriate is that it
would be a substantial and rarely worthwhile resource
commitment. Imagine a situation in which an enforcement
agency has the following choice: it can assign staff lawyers
and economists to support an enforcement action against an
illegal transaction, or it can assign the same staff lawyers
and economists to explain a dozen decisions not to act,
where the explanation follows inextricably from published
guidelines or prior cases, and where explanations of reasons
not to challenge add little or nothing to a public
appreciation of enforcement priorities. Rather than absolute
rules, I believe that explanations of agency decisions, which
are already frequently available, should continue to be left
to the discretion of the agencies-with these general
policies reviewable by Congress, the press and the academic
community.
Why not a rule requiring some statement of reasons
why the FTC sued or settled, reasons why it failed to act, or
an explanation of theories that may have been relevant to a
transaction but were not pursued by the FTC? In this
review, I will concentrate on the policies and experiences of
the FTC-an agency with which I am more familiar than
the Department of Justice. Professor Grimes appreciates
that FTC disclosure policies provide more information than
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. I will leave it to others to
explain why Department of Justice policies, particularly in
the area of criminal enforcement, deserve to be different.
First, Professor Grimes recognizes that the FTC offers
explanations. The FTC in recent years has offered
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explanations that Grimes characterizes as "minimally
adequate" in connection with 56% of its merger enforcement
decisions. 2 In other instances, the Commission may not offer
an explanation but one or two FTC Commissioners,
disappointed with the failure to act, or the scope of action,
may offer explanatory dissenting opinions. Thus, we are
talking about some degree of additional transparency in a
little more than 40% of Commission enforcement actions.
Second, in an increasing number of matters, the
Commission does offer extensive explanations when it
believes Congress, academics or the private sector would
profit. For example, when the Commission decided not to
challenge a merger between Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas, a deal that had important international
consequences, it explained its reasons. 3 When America
Online C'AOL") sought to merge with Time Warner, the
Commission required restructuring before passing on this
deal, but did not pursue vertical anticompetitive theories
(an example of a linear-miss theory).4 The Commission
explained why vertical theories were inappropriate. 5 In its
enforcement action against record companies for minimum
price arrangements on compact disc sales, the Commission
thought it important to pursue a rule of reason rather than
a per se approach and explained why.6 Finally, in the recent
Cruise Lines decision involving a transaction between
several cruise lines, which the Commission failed to
II

2. [d. at 940.

3. See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D.
Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A. Varney Concerning The Boeing
Co.lMcDonnell Douglas Corp., F.T.C. File No. 971-0051 (July 1, 1997), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opaJI997/07Iboeingsta.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003);
Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga Concerning The Boeing Co.,
F.T.C. File No. 971-0051 (July 1, 1997), at http://www.ftc.gov/opaJI997/07/ma.
htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
4. See America Online, Inc. and Time Warner, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C3989,2001 WL 410712, at *1 (F.T.C. Apr. 17,2001); Statement of Commissioner
Mozelle W. Thompson Concerning American Online, Inc. and Time Warner,
Inc., F.T.C. File No. 001-0105 (Apr. 17,2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001l04/
aoltwthompsonstmt.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
5. See America Online, Inc., 2001 WL 410712, at *1.
6. See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila F.
Anthony, Mozelle W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary
Concerning Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.; Universal Music & Video
Distribution Corp., and UMB Recordings, Inc.; and Capitol Records, Inc., d.b.a.
"EMI Music Distribution" et aI., F.T.C. File No. 971-0070 (Aug. 30, 2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/musicstatement.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003).
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challenge, a majority offered an extremely extensive
explanation of its policies in light of the facts of that
transaction and dissenting Commissioners explained why
the majority, in their view, was wrong. 7 Those were
exceptional enforcement matters and deserved special
comment.
Third, the Commission of course could do more, but
there is a serious question whether all transactions that are
not challenged deserve a full exposition. Investigation may
show that the relevant product market is broader than
initially anticipated, so that the combined market share of
the merging parties is 4% or 5%. What could an explanation
of that transaction add to what is already in the horizontal
merger guidelines?
Finally, comparisons to other agencies are a bit
misleading. At its high water mark, the Federal Trade
Commission reviewed almost 5,000 mergers per year
predisclosed under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. 8 The total is
far less today but still more than the number reviewed by
other agencies. Because of filing thresholds, the European
Union reviews a small fraction of U.S. totals. The Federal
Communications Commission examines only media mergers
and transactions and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission examines only transactions in the energy
sector of the economy.
CONCLUSION

Transparency in connection with government
enforcement is essential. My only reservation about
Professor Grimes's proposals is that they appear to
7. See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.IP&O Princess Cruises pIc and Carnival Corp.IP&O
Princess Cruises pIc, F.T.C. File No. 021-0041 (Oct. 4, 2002), at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2002/10/cruisestatement.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003); Dissenting
Statement of Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony and Mozelle W. Thompson,
Concerning Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.IP&O Princess Cruises pIc and
Carnival Corp.IP&O Princess Cruises pIc, F.T.C. File No. 021-0041 (Oct. 4,
2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/cruisedissent.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2003).
8. See William J. Baer, Report from the Bureau of Competition (1999),
Address Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section Spring Meeting
1999, Federal Trade Commission Committee (Apr. 15, 1999) ("In Fiscal Year
1998, the Commission and the Antitrust Division reviewed a record 4,728
[Hart-Scott-Rodinol filings, over three times as many as six years earlier.").
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establish unduly strict requirements for publication of
reasons why an agency acted or failed to act. Given the
substantial resource commitments that would be triggered
by such rules, I would leave the matter to the discretion of
the agencies with careful oversight by Congress. If Congress
supports a policy of more extensive and fuller explanations,
it should be asked to consider making additional resources
available for that purpose in its budget review.
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